

Message Text

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LIMDIS - MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: TEXT OF US INITIAL DRAFT ON

"POSSIBLE THEMES"

1. THE FOLLOWING TEXT WAS CIRCULATED BY US DELEGATION AT THE OCT 22, 1973 AD HOC GROUP MEETING AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION OF THEMES TO BE PRESENTED BY ALLIES DURING FIRST WEEKS OF PLENARY SESSIONS. DRAFT IS BASED UPON PAPER WHICH WAS DEVELOPED AND DISCUSSED BY MBFR CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON DURING SEPTEMBER.

BEGIN TEXT:

I. UNDIMINISHED SECURITY

1. WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

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2. WE INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT NO PARTY SHOULD GAIN A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. WE HAVE ALSO AGREED AMONG OURSELVES THAT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY.

4. WE INTERPET THIS TO MEAN, INTER ALIA, THAT SEPARATE, OR SUCCESSIVE, MEASURES AND MBFR AGREEMENTS WILL EACH HAVE TO CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. IN OTHER WORDS, BOTH MBFR TAKEN AS A WHOLE, AND ALL OF ITS SEPARATE COMPONENTS, SHOULD CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

5. THIS PRINCIPLE IS, OF COURSE, A GENERAL ONE. IT REMAINS TO BE DEFINED IN CONCRETE TERMS WHAT ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE DEEMED BY THE PARTICIPANTS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

6. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, EACH PARTICIPANT WILL HAVE TO DECIDE FOR HIMSELF WHETHER A GIVEN PROPOSAL IS CONSISTENT WITH HIS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OR NOT.

7. WE, FOR OUR PART, REGARD "UNDIMINISHED SECURITY" AS SYNONYMOUS WITH "BALANCED." THUS, THE TERM THAT WE HAVE USED AND CONTINUE TO USE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS MEANT TO DENOTE IN A SHORT-HAND WAY THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MUTUAL AND SHOULD BE CONTRIVED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRESERVE SECURITY UNDIMINISHED.

8. A "BALANCED" AGREEMENT - THAT IS, ONE THAT WE WOULD REGARD AS PRESERVING OUR SECURITY UNDIMINISHED, WILL NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DISPARITIES THAT WE PERCEIVE IN THE EXISTING SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

9. AN AGREEMENT THAT AGGRAVATED THESE DISPARITIES WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US, PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WOULD DIMINISH
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OUR SECURITY.

10. OUR AIM IS TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE THESE DISPARITIES. THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO REDUCE FORCE LEVELS, AT THE SAME TIME ENHANCING STABILITY. SUCH ENHANCED STABILITY WOULD BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST.

11. THE DISPARITIES WE PERCEIVE AS WORKING TO OUR DISADVANTAGE ARE DISPARITIES IN GEOGRAPHY, IN UNIFORMED GROUND PERSONNEL IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND IN THE CHARACTER OF THE FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BRIEFLY, THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT HAVE AN ADVANTAGE IN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS LOCATED MUCH CLOSER TO THE HEART OF EUROPE THAN IS THE US, IT HAS MORE GROUND FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THE TANK-HEAVY

CHARACTER AND FORWARD DISPOSITION OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE GIVE RISE TO PARTICULAR CONCERN.

12. WE ALSO INTERPRET THE CONCEPT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY TO MEAN THAT STABILITY IN OTHER AREAS OUTSIDE OF CENTRAL EUROPE MUST NOT BE DECREASED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

II. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INTERESTS OF OTHERS

1. WE WILL FOCUS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS AGREED, ON CENTRAL EUROPE. BUT WE WILL NEED TO JUDGE POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS ALSO BY THE EFFECTS THAT THEY MAY HAVE IN OTHER REGIONS.

2. THUS, AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO CENTRAL EUROPE CANNOT SERVE THE PURPOSES OF LESSENER CONFRONTATION AND TENSION IN THIS REGION IF IT RESULTS IN A BUILDUP OF FORCES OR HEIGHTENED TENSIONS ELSEWHERE FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE NORTHER OR SOUTHERN REGIONS OF EUROPE.

3. THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT WE BROADEN THE SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH SHOULD DEAL WITH CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT TO STATE THAT AGREEMENTS THERE SHOULD NOT BE DESTABILIZING ELSEWHERE.

4. WHILE THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL FOCUS ON CENTRAL EUROPE, THEIR RESULTS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE
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OF MAINTAINING, INDEED ENHANCING SECURITY FOR ALL OF EUROPE. THIS WAS EXPRESSED IN THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE, WHEN IT WAS AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE "STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE."

5. THE PARTICIPANTS WHO WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE SECURITY OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS REMAINS UNDIMINISHED BY ANY AGREEMENT CONCERNING CENTRAL EUROPE.

III. AREA

1. IT WAS AGREED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT AGREEMENT, AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN IT.

2. THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOCUS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO REDUCE TENSION AND ENHANCE STABILITY IN MAJOR AREAS OF CONFRONTATION AND WITH THE REALITY THAT CENTRAL EUROPE HAS BEEN SUCH AN AREA OVER THE PAST GENERATION. WE WISH TO CONCENTRATE ON CENTRAL EUROPE BECAUSE THIS IS WHERE THE FOCUS OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN FOUND.

3. THE AGREEMENT ON THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOCUS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE ARRANGEMENT ON PARTICIPATION ARRIVED AT IN THE INITIAL TALKS, LEADS US TOWARD A DEFINITION OF THE AREA WITHIN WHICH POSSIBLE FUTURE REDUCTION MEASURES WILL BE CARRIED OUT.

4. IT WAS AGREED AMONG US THAT REPRESENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS RELATED TO CENTRAL EUROPE WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS BY CONSENSUS: BELGIUM, CANADA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR, THE FRG, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, POLAND, THE USSR, THE UK AND THE US. THESE ARE THOSE STATES WITH FORCES OR TERRITORIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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LIMDIS MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

5. IN ADDITION, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF THE NATURE OF HUNGARY'S PARTICIPATION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES: THE EASTERN SIDE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RIGHT.

6. OF THE STATES MENTIONED ABOVE, NOT ALL ARE LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. CANADA, THE USSR, THE UK, AND THE US ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE CENTRAL EUROPE; THESE STATES ARE DECISION-MAKING PARTICIPANTS BECAUSE THEY MAINTAIN FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

7. BY A SIMPLE PROCESS OF ELIMINATION WE ARRIVE AT THE LIST OF THOSE STATES THAT, TOGETHER, COMPRISE CENTRAL EUROPE FOR PURPOSES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THEY HAVE TERRITORY IN CENTRAL EUROPE: BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR, THE FRG, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, AND POLAND, WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS, OR MEASURES STILL REMAINING TO BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED DURING THE

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NEGOTIATIONS.

8. WE CONCLUDE THAT CENTRAL EUROPE, DEFINED IN THIS WAY, WILL BE THE REDUCTION AREA.

9. WE ASSUME THAT THE STATES CONCERNED ARE WILLING TO PROCEED ON THIS BASIS, AND WE BELIEVE IT IS A PRACTICAL WAY TO BEGIN.

VI. DISPARITIES

1. PARTICIPANTS IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS AGREED THAT "SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY."

2. THIS SENTENCE DEFINES WHAT WE MEAN BY "BALANCED."

3. THUS, THE SUBSTANCE, THOUGH NOT THE TERM ITSELF, OF THE CONCEPT HAS BEEN AGREED.

4. THE TERM ITSELF REMAINS VALID FOR US, HOWEVER. WE WILL NOT INSIST ON ITS ACCEPTANCE BY ALL, BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO USE IT OURSELVES AS A SHORTHAND DESCRIPTION OF WHAT WE MEAN BY THE CONCEPT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THUS, A "BALANCED" OUTCOME TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ONE WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, MAINTAINED OUR SECURITY UNDIMINISHED.

5. IF WE ARE TO PRESERVE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, AN AGREEMENT MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DISPARITIES IN THE EXISTING MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

6. THEN DISPARITIES FAVOR THE WARSAW PACT. THUS, AN AGREEMENT WHICH MERELY LEFT THESE DISPARITIES INTACT AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES, OR WORSE YET HAD THE EFFECT OF AGGRAVATING THEM, WOULD DIMINISH OUR SECURITY.

7. GEOGRAPHY: THE USSR ENJOYS A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE OVER THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF DISTANCE THAT FORCES WOULD HAVE TO TRAVEL FROM THE HOMELAND TO CENTRAL EUROPE. WHILE THE USSR IS LOCATED DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO CENTRAL EUROPE, THE

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US IS SEPARATED FROM CENTRAL EUROPE BY THE BROAD EXPANSE OF THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. IT IS LESS THAN 650 KILOMETERS (400 MILES) FROM THE SOVIET BORDER TO THE WESTERN BORDER OF GDR, WHILE IT IS MORE THAN 5,000 KILOMETERS (3,000 MILES) FROM THE US TO THE EASTERN BORDER OF THE FRG. MOREOVER, THE USSR ENJOYS NUMEROUS RELATIVELY SECURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND CENTRAL EUROPE, WHILE THE US HAS EXTENDED SEA AND AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THE USSR CAN BUILD UP ITS FORCES IN THE AREA BY SIMPLY TRAVERSING THE CONTINENT WHILE THE US MUST EMPLOY AIR AND SEA LIFT TO MAKE A COMPARABLE BUILD UP. UNLESS THIS ASYMMETRY IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, REDUCTIONS COULD DIMINISH RATHER THAN ENHANCE STABILITY AND LESSEN THE WESTERN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY.

8. SIZE OF FORCES: FROM THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE, THE LARGE NUMBER OF FORCES MAINTAINED IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY THE

EAST -- PARTICULARLY THE USSR -- CONSTITUTE A SIZEABLE GROUP OF FORCES WHICH COULD BE USED FOR READY ATTACK. EASTERN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE CONSIDERABLY LARGER (&) - FOOT NOTE) THAN WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA.

(& FOOTNOTE --SPECIFICE FIGURES SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN THE FIRST ROUND OF DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC FIGURES IN SUBSEQUENT ROUNDS, HOWEVER.

9. CHARACTER OF FORCES: THE CHARACTER OF EASTERN FORCES IS A MATTER OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE WEST BECAUSE OF THEIR FORWARD GEOGRAPHIC DISPOSITION AND BECAUSE THEY ARE BUILT AROUND A SUBSTANTIAL ARMOR CAPABILITY. ACCORDING TO OUR CALCULATIONS, EASTERN FIELD UNITS HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THENA TWICE AS MANY TANKS IN THE AREA AS DO WESTERN UNITS.

10. INFORMATION ON OPPOSING FORCES: IN WESTERN SOCIETIES, INFORMATION ON FORCES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES IS READILY ACCESSABLE TO THE PUBLIC. THIS IS NOT THE CASE ELSEWHERE. WE DON'T WISH TO ENTER INTO ANY GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERING NATURE OF OR SOCIETIES. WE ARE, HOWEVER, SPEAKING OF A FACTUAL SITUATION WHICH HAS MILITARY IMPLICATIONS, AND WE BELIEVE STABILITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WILL BE ENHANCED IF BOTH SIDES CAN OBTAIN INFORMATION ON
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THE OTHER SIDES' FORCES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES.

V. FORCE ELEMENTS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE WEST

1. IN DISCUSSING FORCE ELEMENTS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO US, WE ARE ADDRESSING OBJECTIVELY EXISTING FACTS. IT IS A FACT BOTH THAT THESE FORCE ELEMENTS EXIST, AND THAT

WE PERCEIVE THEM IN A PARTICULAR WAY.

2. WE ARE NOT QUESTIONING THE MOTIVES OR INTENTIONS OF ANY MBFR PARTICIPANT. TO DO SO WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE. IT COULD LEAD TO POLEMICAL EXCHANGES. MOREOVER, INTENTIONS ARE SUBJECTIVE, NOT OPEN TO VERIFICATION, AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE.

3. THE EASTERN FORCE POSTURE IS PERCEIVED BY THE WEST AS A SOURCE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE WEST BECAUSE OF ITS CAPABILITIES.

4. WE SEE EASTERN--AND PARTICULARLY SOVIET--GROUND FORCES AS CONFIGURED FOR MAXIMIZING THEIR POTENTIAL FOR ATTACK. SPECIFICALLY, THESE FORCES ARE SO ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED THAT THEY PLACE VERY HEAVY EMPHAIS UPON ARMORED CAPABILITIES (MOBILITY AND FIRE POWER), ESPECIALLY TANKS.

5. COMPARED TO WESTERN FORCES, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS ASSIGNED TO EASTERN UNITS IS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER.

6. THE SOVIET TANKS STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE DEPLOYED WELL FORWARD. WITHOUT WISHING TO ATTRIBUTE PARTICULAR INTENTIONS, IT IS NONETHELESS TRUE THAT SUCH A DEPLOYMENT COULD BE AN EFFICIENT BASIS FOR ATTACK.

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7. OVER RECENT YEARS, WE HAVE WITNESSED A GRADUAL INCREASE IN THE STRENGTH, PARTICULARLY THE ARMORED STRENGTH, OF BOTH SOVIET AND

NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS HAS ADDED TO OUR CONCERN.

8. IT SHOULD BE OUR JOINT AIM TO BRING ABOUT A MILITARY POSTURE ON BOTH SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH WILL GIVE NEITHER SIDE CAUSE FOR CONCERN.

VI. FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES

1. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON GROUND FORCES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO REDUCE TENSION AND ENHANCE STABILITY WHERE TENSION THREATENS MOST AND WHERE STABILITY COULD MOST EASILY BE THREATENED, SINCE IT ACCORDS WITH THE REALITY THAT GROUND FORCES ARE THE FORCES WHICH COULD INVADE OR OCCUPY TERRITORY.

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3. NUMERICALLY, PHYSICALLY, AND PERHAPS ALSO ECONOMICALLY, GROUND FORCES CONSTITUTE THE LARGEST SINGLE ELEMENT IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION. THEY ARE IN FACT THE NUB OF THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

4. IT IS IMPORTANT, FURTHER, TO SEEK THE SHORTEST AND MOST PRACTICAL PATH TO OUR GOAL. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE UNPARALLELED IN COMPLEXITY, AS REGARDS BOTH THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE INTEREST OF THE PARTICIPANTS. WE SHOULD AVOID ADDING UNNECESSARILY TO THE COMPLEXITIES WE MUST FACE IN ANY EVENT. SINCE GROUND FORCES ARE THEMSELVES TO IMPORTANT, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ADDRESS GROUND FORCES ONLY, IN THE INTEREST OF SIMPLICITY.

5. BY CONCENTRATING ON GROUND FORCES, WE WILL BE DEMONSTRATING TO OUR PUBLICS THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT REDUCING TENSIONS. THE PUBLIC KNOWS FROM BITTER EXPERIENCE THAT IT IS GROUND FORCES WHICH INVADE OR OCCUPY TERRITORY, AND THEY WILL JUSTIFIABLY EXPECT US TO ADDRESS GROUND FORCES.

VII. PARITY - COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE

1. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF MBFR SHOULD BE APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

2. THIS WOULD BE BOTH FAIR AND EQUITABLE.

3. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD AFFORD THE MOST REALISTIC PROSPECT FOR ENHANCED STABILITY AND A LASTING PEACE. THIS WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL.

4. STABILITY AND PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND INTIMATELY LINKED WITH EACH OTHER. WHERE NEITHER SIDE HAS A SIGNIFICANT UNILATERAL AD-

VANTAGE, OR HOPE OF ACHIEVING IT, THERE CAN BE NO INCENTIVE TO RISK TAKING. MOREOVER, A SITUATION OF COMPLETE STABILITY MINIMIZES ANY POSSIBILITY OF OUTBREAK OF UNINTENTIONAL WAR THROUGH MISCALCULATION, MISINTERPRETATION, MISUNDERSTANDING OR FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION.

5. YOU WILL NOTE THAT WE HAVE SPOKEN OF OUR ULTIMATE GOAL AS ONE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY.

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6. PARITY IS NOT A CONDITION WHICH CAN BE DEFINED PRECISELY. TO OBTAIN A PRECISE DEFINITION OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE TWO FORCES WHICH CONFRONT EACH OTHER, ONE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SUCH FACTORS AS THE STRUCTURE OF FORCES, THE NUMBERS AND QUALITY OF VARIOUS ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT, THEIR STATE OF TRAINING, THE GEOGRAPHY IN WHICH THEY MUST OPERATE, AND EVEN THEIR MORALE. WE CANNOT HOPE TO DO SO. FURTHERMORE, THE DIFFERENCES IN GEOGRAPHY CANNOT BE ELIMINATED, AND OTHER DIFFERENCES MEAN THAT THE FORCES COULD NEVER BE PRECISELY IDENTICAL.

7. IN VIEW OF THESE DIFFICULTIES, WE MUST ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE PROBLEM TO MORE MANAGEABLE PROPORTIONS. WE MUST BE SELECTIVE AND FOCUS ON ELEMENTS IN THE CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE.

8. THE SINGLE FACTOR WHICH IS MOST READILY COMPARED AS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IS ALSO THE ONE WHICH IS MOST FUNDAMENTAL TO A MILITARY BALANCE -- GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. WEAPONS CHANGE OVER THE YEARS, BUT THE TRAINED SOLDIER REMAINS THE BASIS OF MILITARY STRENGTH.

9. GROUND FORCES COMPRISE THE LARGEST SINGLE ELEMENT IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION. THEY ARE THE FORCES WHICH COULD INVADE AND OCCUPY FOREIGN TERRITORY. THEY ARE IN FACT THE MOST TENSION-CAUSING ELEMENT OF THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

10. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF APPROXIMATE EAST-WEST PARITY IN TERMS OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY AND DEPLOYMENT, WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THEREBY THE PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THIS AREA.

11. WE DO NOT NOW HAVE EVEN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN NUMBERS OF GROUND PERSONNEL. EASTERN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA.

12. REDUCTIONS TO LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES SHOULD NOT PRESERVE -- FAR LESS, AGGRAVATE -- THIS DISPARITY. REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING WOULD ELIMINATE THE DISPARITY, THEREBY ENHANCING STABILITY.

13. THE REALIZATION OF THIS GOAL IS PERFECTLY CONSISTENT WITH

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THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES. NO ONE SHOULD SEEK TO GAIN -- OR TO PRESERVE -- A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IN EXCESS OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS IN KEEPING WITH THE RIGHT OF EACH PARTY TO MAINTAIN ITS SECURITY. INDEED, IN A SITUATION OF GREATER STABILITY, THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES IS ACTUALLY ENHANCED.

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LIMDIS - MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

VIII. PHASING

1. IN VIEW OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR INITIAL GOAL IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE OVER-AMBITIOUS.

2. THE AGREED CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WILL ALSO MAKE IT DESIRABLE FOR US TO PROCEED WITH DUE PRUDENCE.

3. THUS, WE DO NOT ENVISAGE THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON MAN-POWER CEILING, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITIES, WOULD BE REACHED IN ONE NEGOTIATING PHASE.

4. A MORE MODEST, MORE PRACTICAL, MORE PRUDENT INITIAL

GOAL WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT WHICH MOVED-PARTY-WAY TOWARD SUCH AN ULTIMATE GOAL.

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5. IF FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE COULD CONSIDER NEGOTIATING FURTHER REDUCTIONS, WHICH MIGHT COMPLETE MOVEMENT TOWARD THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF A COMMON CEILING.

6. THE POSSIBILITY THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TAKE PLCE IN MORE THAN ONE PHASE, AND RESULT IN MORE THAN ONE AGREEMENT, WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THIW, IN FACT, IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENT EMBODIED IN THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE THAT "SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY."

IX. FOCUS ON US AND SOVIET FORCES

1. WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOAL OF INCREASING STABILITY WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. IN OUR OWN EXPERIENCE, IT HAS BEEN THE DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH HAS BEEN THE ELEMENT OF GREATEST CONCERN AND APPREHENSION FOR THOSE IN THE WEST. WE DO NOT WISH TO ENGAGE HERE IN ARGUMENTS OVER INTENTIONS; INTENTIONS ARE NOT AT STAKE. WHAT IS IMPORTANT FOR US IS CAPABILITY, AND THE FACT THAT POWERFUL SOVIET GROUND FORCES CONTINUE TO BE STATIONED IN THIS AREA IS THE REALITY WITH WHICH WE MUST DEAL AND WITH WHICH WE BELIEVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD DEAL.

3. THE US, FOR ITS PART, WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE ITS GROUND FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE REDUCED AS A RESULT OF A FIST-STAGE AGREEMENT. THEY ARE THERE IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS; THEY CAN BE REDUCED IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND OTHER ASSOCIATED MEASURES DESIGNED TO ASSURE THE VIABILITY OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

4. IT WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED BY THE SIMPLEST PATH TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND ENHANCE STABILITY IF SOVIET AND US FORCES WERE REDUCED.

5. SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES ARE THE LARGEST COMPONENT
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FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA OUTSIDE THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORY, AND REPRESENT THE LARGEST POWERS IN BOTH GROUPINGS. WITHDRAWAL

TO THEIR HOMELANDS OF SOME SOVIET AND US FORCES WOULD; THEREFORE, MAKE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY.

X. REDUCTIONS ALONE NOT ENOUGH: STABILIZING MEASURES, VERIFICATION, NON-CIRCUMVENTION

1. IN MBFR WE SEEK GREATER STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. TO ENHANCE STABILITY, REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY CERTAIN "ASSOCIATED MEASURES."

2. WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED (IN THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE) TO CONSIDER "ASSOCIATED MEASURES."

3. AGREEMENT ON APPROPRIATE "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" COULD, WE BELIEVE, CREATE A CONTEXT IN WHICH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SEEN AS OPERATING TO THE ADVANTAGE OF BOTH SIDES, AND THEREFORE AS ENHANCING STABILITY.

4. APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES COULD ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE FEAR OF POTENTIAL SURPRISE ATTACK.

5. MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WOULD BE ENHANCED BY REDUCING THE RISK THAT INNOCENT ACTIONS MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED AND CONSIDERED THREATENING. THIS WOULD ENHANCE LONGER-TERM STABILITY.

6. THE FEAR OF POTENTIAL SURPRISE ATTACK WOULD BE REDUCED IF EACH PARTY HAD GREATER CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITY TO RECEIVE Surer AND MORE TIMELY WARNING OF A POSSIBLE ATTACK.

7. BETTER WARNING WOULD GIVE EACH PARTY GREATER ASSURANCE THAT IT COULD TAKE APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE MEASURES, IF IT FELT THAT ITS SECURITY WAS THREATENED. THUS, A GREATER SENSE OF SECURITY, AND GREATER MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, COULD RESULT OVER THE LONGER TERM.

8. IN SPEAKING OF "WARNING" AND "SURPRISE ATTACK", WE ARE NOT DISCUSSING THE ACTUAL INTENTIONS OF ANY PARTICIPANT. WE WOULD NOT BE HERE IF EITHER SIDE BELIEVED THAT THE OTHER WAS PREPARING
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A SURPRISE ATTACK. NEVERTHELESS, THE CAPABILITY TO ATTACK WITH A MINIMUM OF WARNING EXISTS. SUCH A CAPABILITY IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHERE THERE IS SUCH A GREAT CONCENTRATION OF FORCES OFFERING POSSIBILITIES OF MASSING IN EVEN MORE CONCENTRATED WAYS.

9. THE PROBLEM OF WARNING IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF FORCE LEVELS. EACH SIDE WILL FEEL THAT IT CAN AFFORD SMALLER FORCES IF IT HAS GREATER CONFIDENCE IN WARNING.

10. MEASURES WHICH COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF ENHANCING

WARNING WOULD FAVOR THE DEFENDER OVER AN AGGRESSOR.

11. WE WILL HAVE SPECIFIC MEASURES TO PROPOSE AT A LATER POINT. IN GENERAL, WE BELIEVE SUCH MEASURES SHOULD SERVE TO SET CLEAR THRESHOLDS. ACTIVITIES BELOW THE THRESHOLDS WOULD BE CONSIDERED ROUTINE, AND WOULD NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY PARTICULAR CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE OTHER SIDE. ACTIVITIES WHICH EXCEEDED THE AGREED THRESHOLDS WOULD, BY DEFINITION, BE CONSIDERED AS ILLICIT, AND WOULD FOR THAT REASON BE LEGITIMATE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN BY THE OTHER SIDE.

12. THUS, THE KINDS OF MEASURE WE HAVE IN MIND WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF CLARIFYING THE CHARACTER OF ROUTINE TROOP MOVEMENTS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES, THEREBY DEMONSTRATING TO ALL PARTIES IN AN UNAMBIGUOUS WAY THAT THEY ARE NOT DESIGNED TO COVER PREPARATIONS FOR AN ATTACK.

13. MOREOVER, THE MEASURES WE CONTEMPLATE WOULD INTRODUCE AN ADDITIONAL DEGREE OF STABILITY IF A SEVERE CRISIS SHOULD OCCUR IN EUROPE, THUS REDUCING THE DANGER THAT A WAR MIGHT BREAK OUT THROUGH MISCALCULATION.

14. (VERIFICATION). SINCE REDUCTIONS ARE TO BE MUTUAL, EACH SIDE WILL WISH TO ASSURE ITSELF THAT REDUCTIONS WILL HAVE TAKEN PLACE AS AGREED. HOW WE WILL ASSURE OURSELVES ON THIS IMPORTANT POINT WILL DEPEND ON THE AGREEMENT TO BE VERIFIED. ANYTHING LESS THAN ADEQUATE VERIFICATION WOULD AROUSE APPREHENSIONS WHICH WOULD, IN TURN, DETRACT FROM THE LONGER TERM STABILITY WE SEEK.

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15. (NON-CIRCUMVENTION). IF MBFR IS TO ESTABLISH A SENSE OF UNDIMINISHED, AND WE WOULD HOPE, ENHANCED SENSE OF SECURITY AMONG THE PARTIES HERE, IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL FOR US TO ASSURE OURSELVES THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED, FOR EXAMPLE BY ACTIVITIES ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE REDUCTION AREA. HOW SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD BE EXPRESSED IN THE AGREEMENT WILL, OF COURSE, DEPEND ON ITS OTHER TERMS. NEVERTHELESS, AT THIS STAGE, WE CONSIDER THIS CONCEPT ESSENTIAL.
END TEXT.HUMES

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